



INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES

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This instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 90-2, *Inspector General - The Inspection System*; Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3150.2, *Safety Studies and Reviews of Nuclear Weapon System*, February 8, 1984, and Technical Order (TO) 11N-25-1, *DoD Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection System*. It provides guidance and procedures for the Air Force Inspection and Nuclear Surety Programs.

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This revision specifies that AF-level Special Interest Items be evaluated during all ORIs, QAFAs, and other inspections using the 5-level grading system unless otherwise specified. A definition for the Acquisition Oversight Coordination Board is included in the terms. The Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Common-Core Criteria Compliance item is expanded to include Communications-Electronic (CE) equipment. All references to the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) are changed to reflect their new name, the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA). A ★ indicates revisions from the previous edition.

Paragraph

Chapter 1—RESPONSIBILITIES

Secretary of the Air Force, Inspector General (SAF/IG).....	1.1.
Secretary of the Air Force, General Counsel (SAF/GC).....	1.2.
Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA).....	1.3.
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (HQ USAF/IN).....	1.4.
All Other HQ USAF Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCS).....	1.5.
Major Commands.....	1.6.
Chief of Safety (HQ USAF/SE).....	1.7.
Air Force Safety Agency, Nuclear Safety Directorate (HQ AFSA/SEN).....	1.8.
MAJCOMs With Nuclear-Capable Units.....	1.9.

Chapter 2—AIR FORCE INSPECTION AGENCY (AFIA) INSPECTION PROGRAM ELEMENTS

Management Reviews.....	2.1.
Inspections in the Field.....	2.2.
Health Services Inspections (HSI).....	2.3.
★Special Interest Items (SII).....	2.4.
Inspector General Directed Investigations (IGDI).....	2.5.
Air Force IG School.....	2.6.
TIG Brief Magazine.....	2.7.

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Paragraph

Chapter 3—AIR FORCE INSPECTION PROGRAM ELEMENTS

Common-Core Criteria (CCC).....	3.1.
Inspector Training.....	3.2.
Inspection Scheduling and Coordination.....	3.3.
Inspection Report Handling.....	3.4.
Special Interest Item (SII) Instructions.....	3.5.
Five-Level Rating System.....	3.6.

Chapter 4—US AIR FORCE NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTION PROGRAM

NSI Program Guidance.....	4.1.
Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI).....	4.2.
Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI).....	4.3.
Limited Nuclear Surety Inspection (LNSI).....	4.4.
Nuclear Inspection Areas and Criteria.....	4.5.
Nuclear Inspection Rating System.....	4.6.
Reinspection of Deficient Areas.....	4.7.
Actions on Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA) Inspection Reports.....	4.8.
Nuclear Inspection Reports.....	4.9.

Page

Attachments

1. GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES, ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND TERMS.....	12
2. MESSAGE FORMAT FOR NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTIONS.....	18
3. MESSAGE FORMAT (EXTRACT) FOR NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTIONS.....	20
4. COMMON-CORE CRITERIA (CCC) <i>Areas Evaluated During All Phases.....</i>	22
5. COMMON-CORE CRITERIA (CCC) <i>Areas Evaluated in a Specific Major Grading Category.....</i>	23
6. COMMON-CORE CRITERIA (CCC) <i>Compliance Areas.....</i>	26

Chapter 1**RESPONSIBILITIES**

1.1. Secretary of the Air Force, Inspector General (SAF/IG). Reports force readiness to the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF). Writes policy and oversees the Air Force Inspection System. SAF/IG may direct assessment of any Air Force program or operation, including United States Air Force Reserve (USAFR) and Air National Guard (ANG) organizations and units. SAF/IG informs commanders on the management review process, solicits review topics and sponsors from the Secretariat and Air Staff (HQ USAF), provides comments to Major Commands (MAJCOMs), direct reporting units (DRU), and field operating agencies (FOA) on the adequacy of their Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) and Quality Air Force Assessment (QAFA) criteria, and approves Special Interest Items (SIIs).

1.2. Secretary of the Air Force, General Counsel (SAF/GC). The legal counsel on all Air Force Intelligence Oversight (IO) issues, and provides advice to intelligence components on questions of legality or propriety.

1.3. Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA). Conducts inspection programs approved by SAF/IG.

1.4. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (HQ USAF/IN). Issues policy to ensure the proper supervision and control of Air Force intelligence activities. AFI 14-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities* (formerly AFR 200-19), provides guidance on the scope and applicability of the Air Force Intelligence Oversight Program.

1.5. All Other HQ USAF Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCS). Submit and sponsor review topics, and review MAJCOM ORI and QAFA criteria upon request of Secretary of the Air Force, Inspector General, Inspections Directorate (SAF/IGI).

1.6. Major Commands. Submit proposed review topics and a schedule of inspection activity to Headquarters Air Force Inspection Agency, Inspection Support Division (HQ AFIA/CSV) for coordination. Submit ORI and QAFA criteria to SAF/IGI and Headquarters Air Force Inspection Agency, Field Inspection Directorate (HQ AFIA/FI) MAJCOM liaison officers for review.

1.7. Chief of Safety (HQ USAF/SE). Approves nuclear surety inspection criteria and oversees the program with SAF/IG, who implements inspection programs.

1.8. Air Force Safety Agency, Nuclear Safety Directorate (HQ AFSA/SEN).

- Develops Air Force plans, guidance, and procedures for conducting NSI, and performs inspections according to chapter 4 of this instruction.
- Reviews major deficiencies identified in NSI reports. If necessary, returns the report and outlines actions requiring MAJCOM action.
- Approves requests for waivers or deferments of nuclear inspections required by this AFI, and sends copies of approved requests to Deputy Chief of Staff, Safety Programs (HQ USAF/SEP).
- Provides observers when Field Command, Defense Special Weapons Agency (FCDSWA) inspects Air Force units according to the memorandum of agreement between SAF/IG and the Director, Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA).
- Reviews MAJCOM actions taken to correct deficiencies identified during FCDSWA inspections and endorses them to DSWA. If necessary, returns the report and outlines those actions requiring MAJCOM action before sending it to DSWA.
- Provides augmentees for an NSI when requested by the MAJCOM.
- Responsible for AFI 91-series publications (*Safety*) and specific parts of other directives (AFI 36-2105, *Officer Classification* (formerly AFR 36-1); AFI 91-204, *Investigating and Reporting Mishaps* (formerly AFR 127-4); and AFJI 11-204, *Operational Procedures for Aircraft Carrying Hazardous Material* (AFR 55-14)).
- Oversees 25 percent of the total annual MAJCOM-conducted NSIs on a non-interference basis. The AFSA team chief will provide the MAJCOM team chief a brief unrated written assessment of observations identifying possible areas for improving the NSI process.
- Schedules field visits with MAJCOM NSI teams to assist in staff responsibilities. Field visits are not inspections, reports are not prepared, and concurrence with NSI team findings is not required. They are coordinated under the IG Trusted Agent system to protect the minimum or no-notice aspect of the inspection.
- Provides a summary and analysis of NSI or Limited Nuclear Surety Inspection (LNSI) data, including major deficiency corrective actions, to Commander, Air Force Safety Agency (HQ AFSA/CC) for inclusion in the semiannual NSI results analysis briefing to CSAF.

1.9. MAJCOMs With Nuclear-Capable Units.

- Conduct inspections required by this AFI.
- Send a message report on all NSIs (see attachments 2 and 3). Include significant details on all limiting factors (LIMFAC) and major deficiencies, corrective actions immediately applied, and deficiencies or unusual situations that affect the safety, security, or reliability of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon systems.
- Provide the inspected unit a report, within 30 calendar days, with enough detail to help accomplish corrective actions.
- For all major deficiencies, ensure final NSI reports include the complete description of each validated deficiency and the root cause, and the impact of the deficiency on the safety, security, or reliability of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon systems.
- Develop NSI criteria and include all applicable functions listed in paragraph 4.5. Send a copy of proposed criteria to HQ AFSA/SENS, 9700 Avenue G SE, Kirtland AFB NM 87117-5670, for review and approval. Publish approved criteria as a MAJCOM supplement to this AFI, and provide one copy to HQ AFSA/SENS.
- Develop NSI checklists (with references) and send copies of checklists and changes to HQ AFSA/SENS.
- Comply with chapter 4 on Defense Nuclear Surety Inspections (DNSI).

Chapter 2

AIR FORCE INSPECTION AGENCY (AFIA) INSPECTION PROGRAM ELEMENTS

2.1. Management Reviews. Functional management reviews (FMR) usually assess specific aspects of Air Force programs,

acquisition management reviews (AMR) assess acquisition processes and programs, and special management reviews (SMR) assess leadership-identified subjects.

2.1.1. Topic Selection and Approval. Air Force personnel may forward proposed topics, including background or rationale. HQ USAF forwards topics directly to SAF/IGI. MAJCOMs, FOAs, and DRUs forward topics that cross MAJCOM lines or apply Air Force-wide to HQ AFIA/CCV and SAF/IGI. Inspectors coordinate these and directorate topics to preclude redundant studies. HQ AFIA/CC and SAF/IGI coordinate with Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD-IG), the Acquisition Oversight Coordination Board (AOCB), and other oversight agencies. SAF/IG approves the topics. AFIA addresses readiness issues prior to other subjects.

2.1.2. Topic Sponsors. AFIA inspectors design FMRs and AMRs to meet HQ USAF or Air Force senior commanders' needs. SAF/IG may independently sponsor a topic. AFIA sends information copies of all reviews to SAF/IG.

2.1.3. Reply Instructions. Critical issues identified by AFIA inspectors require a one-time reply to specify corrective action. Topic sponsors may request additional follow-up, review, or further inspection. SAF/IG may also direct follow-up on any issues identified in management reviews or field inspections.

2.2. Inspections in the Field. Provide SAF/IG credible, independent assessments of Air Force operational readiness, efficiency, discipline, morale, economy, and effectiveness; provide opportunities to report personal complaints, fraud, waste, and abuse disclosures; and provide oversight of the inspection system.

2.2.1. Major Command Quality Air Force Assessments (MQAFA). AFIA conducts MQAFAs with MAJCOM IG teams' evaluation of their own headquarters.

2.2.1.1. HQ AFIA/FI validates the checklists and metrics provided by HQ USAF and distributes them to MAJCOM IGs. AFIA inspectors accompany MAJCOM inspectors during MQAFAs to observe their inspection process, emphasizing Air Force policy issues, checklists, and metrics.

2.2.1.2. AFIA writes an independent field memorandum on the MAJCOM IG team's QAFA process and MAJCOM DCS implementation of Air Force policies. Distribute to the MAJCOM commander, MAJCOM IG, and SAF/IG.

2.2.2. FOA and DRU QAFA. AFIA assesses FOAs and DRUs every 3 years.

2.2.2.1. The FOA or DRU provides a unit self-assessment to HQ AFIA/FI 30 calendar days before the QAFA. Inspectors use the Quality Air Force criteria to assess unit mission, organizational structure, implementation of Air Force policy, resources, factors hindering mission accomplishment, relationship with Air Staff sponsor (if applicable), and compliance with Air Force policy and instructions.

2.2.2.2. AFIA writes an independent field memorandum. Distribute to the FOA or DRU commander, Air Staff sponsor, and SAF/IG.

2.2.3. IG Team Augmentation. On request, AFIA inspectors augment MAJCOM and NAF IG teams during ORIs or QAFA of field units and during over-the-shoulder inspections of NAF-conducted ORIs. AFIA augmenters do not write a separate report. Rated inspectors with current medical and physiological training prerequisites may fly as observers in unit aircraft when appropriate to their inspection role. AFIA, Air Force Materiel Command, and Air Force Audit Agency (AFAA) may also augment each other.

2.2.4. Multi-MAJCOM Exercises (MMX). With MAJCOM coordination, AFIA inspectors may attend MMXs to observe and report on issues of Air Force-level interest. HQ AFIA/FI may request specific scenarios and unit tasking for MMXs and battle staff exercises (BSX) through Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations (HQ USAF/XO).

2.2.4.1. Inspectors review lessons learned from previous exercises or contingencies and may accompany participating units. Following the initial stage, inspectors write a field memorandum emphasizing readiness issues, effectiveness of MAJCOM ORI processes and training programs, and effectiveness of the lessons learned system. Distribution is limited to the exercise director, HQ USAF/XO, and SAF/IG.

2.2.5. Contingencies and Combat. AFIA inspectors may deploy to forward locations and field headquarters during contingency and combat to observe processes and recommend solutions to readiness problems beyond the control of the local Air Force field commander. This is not an inspection, but is an opportunity for an independent and impartial Air Force-level team to analyze systemic readiness problems which need HQ USAF or higher level attention to solve. Refer also to War Mobilization Plan, Volume 1, Annex O.

2.3. Health Services Inspections (HSI). Assess the ability of medical units to fulfill their peacetime and wartime missions, and evaluate medical care and the effectiveness and efficiency of medical management.

2.3.1. Criteria and Inspection Guides. HQ AFIA/SG derives criteria from health care policies of DoD, Surgeon General (HQ USAF/SG), MAJCOMs, various civilian medical oversight agencies (such as the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Health Care Organizations), the ANG, and USAFR. As an aid to inspectors and medical units, HQ AFIA/SG updates and distributes inspection guides.

2.3.2. Ratings. HQ AFIA/SG rates active medical units on health care delivery, resources, and readiness using the five-level grading system. When MAJCOM ORIs or QAFAs inspect readiness, they use the MAJCOM rating system.

2.3.3. Schedules. Publish the schedules annually; notify units at least 60 calendar days in advance.

2.3.4. Inspectors Briefs. Inspectors brief results to the medical unit and installation commander and write an interim field memorandum for the inspected unit. Send the final report to the inspected unit and higher headquarters.

★2.4. Special Interest Items (SII). Provide Air Force leadership a means to communicate their concerns to, and obtain feedback from, the field. Requests for Air Force SIIs may be initiated at any level, but must be coordinated through IG channels to SAF/IG. Required actions are based on a comprehensive inspection guide. SAF/IG approves these SIIs, then HQ AFIA/CVS assigns a project officer to manage the SII and prepare a final report. SIIs will be evaluated during all ORIs, QAFAs, and other inspections using the 5-level grading system unless otherwise specified.

2.5. Inspector General Directed Investigations (IGDI). A high-priority investigation directed by the Inspector General. These investigations are usually time sensitive, whose findings and recommendations are of significant interest to the Air Force, Members of Congress, or the general public. The Inspector General approves all requests for IGDIs and determines team composition, as appropriate.

2.6. Air Force IG School. AFIA is responsible for the content and conduct of the Air Force IG School to provide training for AFIA, Air Force, and Department of Defense (DoD) personnel, as required.

2.7. TIG Brief Magazine. AFIA provides essential inspection-related information to commanders, staffs, and established IG teams through the TIG Brief (AFRP 90-1). Articles may be submitted by anyone. Subject of articles may include:

- Anticipated or actual problem areas.
- Recommendations to improve management, safety, security, inspection, and operational techniques.
- A “cross-tell” of outstanding practices and procedures.

Chapter 3

AIR FORCE INSPECTION PROGRAM ELEMENTS

3.1. Common-Core Criteria (CCC). Results of independent assessments and inspections conducted by MAJCOM IGs provide the Secretary of the Air Force a status of unit efficiency and combat readiness of the force. To assess units, MAJCOMs will develop Quality Air Force Assessment (QAFA) guidelines and Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) criteria, and use the common-core guidance described below as it applies to their units.

3.1.1 CCC Purpose. Common-core criteria establish selected Air Force readiness inspection areas which all MAJCOM IGs should evaluate during ORIs or QAFAs (as applicable). MAJCOM IGs will ensure all functions and units conform to required standards for mobilizing, deploying, and employing their personnel and assets. This Air Force-level oversight guarantees that Air Force units, regardless of MAJCOM, can meet unified commanders’ wartime or contingency requirements. IG teams should use attachments 4 through 6 to develop specific criteria to assess their organizations’ missions.

3.1.2. Criteria Application. CCC can be applied to the four major grading areas: Initial Response, Employment, Mission Support, and Ability to Survive and Operate. Within each, selected subareas are listed and general evaluation guidelines described. MAJCOMs should address these subareas and supplement as required to develop comprehensive inspections for assigned units.

3.1.3. Criteria Implementation. MAJCOM IGs should focus on mission performance. Academic testing should not be used as a primary measure of ability unless it serves a specific inspection objective, or hands-on performance cannot be observed.

3.1.3.1. IG teams should develop inspection scenarios to evaluate a unit’s ability to operate under expected wartime conditions and taskings according to the War Mobilization Plan, Volume 1 (WMP-1). Applicable wartime CCC should be emphasized.

3.1.3.2. IG teams should maximize their efforts (within reason) to create a realistic atmosphere. They should only consider simulation of a scenario task when identified LIMFACs have an adverse impact on the unit’s critical daily operations. Teams must always develop scenarios to ensure safety is not compromised.

3.1.3.3. IG teams may conduct inspections on a notice, limited notice, or no-notice basis to achieve desired objectives. They may conduct QAFAs as a separate event or combine with ORIs.

3.2. Inspector Training. MAJCOMs, DRUs, and FOAs with established IG teams will ensure inspectors are provided with US Air Force IG School or equivalent training as soon as possible. Other personnel may be scheduled for this training based upon involvement with inspection programs.

3.3. Inspection Scheduling and Coordination.

3.3.1. Inspectors general identify personnel as Trusted Agents, authorized to release close hold, no-notice inspection schedules, to HQ AFIA/CVS. Personnel assigned to SAF/IG staff and AFIA are designated Trusted Agents. Trusted Agents do not divulge information to unauthorized personnel. Commanders at all levels ensure the integrity of the Trusted Agent system.

3.3.2. Established IG teams submit prior-notice and no-notice (Trusted Agent) 6-month schedules to HQ AFIA/CVS using AF Form 503, **Inspection Scheduling Report**, RCS: SAF-IG(Q)7301. Forward submissions quarterly to arrive not later than 1 February, 1 May, 1 August, and 1 November. Forward out-of-cycle changes by telephone or mail as appropriate. HQ AFIA/CVS distributes the consolidated report to SAF/IGI, HQ AFSA/SEN, and established IG teams. This report carries emergency status code D. Immediately discontinue reporting data requirements during emergency conditions.

3.3.3. Established IG teams coordinate with their own headquarters staff and AFSA representatives to ensure staff assistance visits, audit schedules, and topics do not duplicate or conflict with inspection schedules or topics. AFIA and AFSA conduct quarterly coordination of centrally-directed audits and inspection topics.

3.3.4. Commanders and staffs notify inspector general teams of schedule conflicts based on operational or exercise taskings.

3.3.5. Commanders ensure key management personnel are on duty and available to DoD-IG, AFIA, or other established IG team inspectors.

3.4. Inspection Report Handling.

3.4.1. Reports of inspection are PRIVILEGED DOCUMENTS and the Air Force controls their distribution. Commanders must ensure that the privileged nature of inspection reports is protected. For example, neither ratings nor findings may be repeated verbatim in base newspapers or similar public access media.

3.4.2. Inspectors must mark unclassified reports and portions of reports "For Official Use Only" (FOUO) if they contain FOUO information (AFI 37-131, *Air Force Freedom of Information Act Program*, (formerly AFR 4-33). Mark reports containing classified information as prescribed by DoD Regulation 5200.1-R and AFI 31-401, *Information Security Program Regulation* (AFR 205-1). Maintain or destroy old reports marked "privileged information" according to AFI 37-131 guidance for FOUO material.

3.4.3. The following statement must appear on the cover or in the body of each report: "This is a PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT that cannot be released in whole or part to persons or agencies outside the Air Force, nor can it be republished in whole or part in any publication not containing this statement, including Air Force magazines and general use pamphlets, without the express approval of the Secretary of the Air Force." Include similar statements on reports of inspections conducted jointly by evaluation teams from DoD agencies.

3.5. Special Interest Item (SII) Instructions.

3.5.1. Purpose. The SII process provides Air Force leadership a system to communicate their concerns to the field and to get answers about specific conditions in the field. Use SIIs to determine the degree of compliance with directives, policies, and procedures. Also use them to gather information on known or suspected problems, to identify specific deficiencies, or to confirm that a problem has been resolved. Appropriate authorities analyze feedback from SIIs to facilitate decision-making and policy adjustments.

3.5.2. Policy. The Air Force Inspector General (SAF/IG) is the responsible authority for Air Force SIIs. Proposed Air Force-wide SII topics may originate at any level, but are normally sponsored by a MAJCOM or HQ DCS. SIIs, when appropriate, will be evaluated using the 5-level grading system. AFIA manages Air Force-wide SIIs.

3.5.3. SII Categories. The sponsor of the Air Force-wide SII considers one of two categories:

3.5.3.1. Long-Term SII. Sponsor uses long-term SIIs when an issue is pervasive and is of major importance Air Force-wide or when assessing compliance in a specific area of concern. The time period is normally 6 months to a year.

3.5.3.2. Short-Term SII. Short-term SIIs include subject areas within a limited scope or issues that are analyzed from data based on past inspections or from results of a one-time survey. The time period is less than 3 months.

3.5.4. Responsibilities:

3.5.4.1. SAF/IG establishes policy governing SIIs, receives requests for SIIs, and directs AFIA actions.

3.5.4.2. HQ USAF provides SAF/IG and AFIA with suggested inspection guides upon request.

3.5.4.3. AFIA:

- Provides SII tasks to MAJCOM, DRU, and FOA IGs.
- Receives, correlates, and analyzes SII information.

- Reports SII results to SAF/IG and the sponsoring agency.
- 3.5.4.4. MAJCOMs, DRUs, and FOAs:
- Assist functional staffs in developing SII requests, and
 - Inspect and report on Air Force SIIs as requested.
- 3.5.5. Request Procedures. Submit coordinated SII requests to SAF/IG in the following format:
- 3.5.5.1. Subject. Proposed title of SII.
- 3.5.5.2. Purpose. Formulate a clear statement of the problem. State the goals and objectives of the SII, what information is desired, and how the sponsor intends to use the data.
- 3.5.5.3. SII Category. Stipulate category requested.
- 3.5.5.4. Background. Provide sufficient background information to give inspectors an insight to the problem.
- ★3.5.5.5. Actions Required. Include a comprehensive inspection guide for inspectors to evaluate the SII topic. Use the five-level grading system unless otherwise directed in the implementing instructions.
- 3.5.6. Reporting Requirements:
- 3.5.6.1. MAJCOM, DRU, and FOA IGs will document the results of SII inspections as a separate attachment to the ORI or QAFA report or as a stand alone report, as instructed by AFIA.
- 3.5.6.2. AFIA will consolidate results and report conclusions and recommendations through SAF/IG to the SII sponsor.

3.6. Five-Level Rating System. Use five levels of grading (Outstanding, Excellent, Satisfactory, Marginal, Unsatisfactory) in all inspection reports that require the use of a rating system. These levels are mandatory for grading compliance inspection items, and are also used to describe the overall rating of major grading areas. QAFAs will evaluate results as well as processes, and may be graded using the 5-level grading system, the 1,000 point QAF criteria scoring system, or a combination of both.

NOTE: Team chiefs may assign ratings that accurately reflect observed performance regardless of statistical outcomes. Specific criteria are designed as a guide and are not a substitute for the judgment of the inspector general; however, when ratings differ greatly from established criteria, the rationale should be explained.

Chapter 4

US AIR FORCE NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTION PROGRAM

(When inspecting a nuclear-capable unit, inspection teams also follow the general inspection system procedures in this instruction.)

4.1. NSI Program Guidance. MAJCOM IGs evaluate a unit's management of nuclear resources against approved safety, security, and reliability standards.

- 4.1.1. Base the final rating on the nature, severity, and number of deficiencies noted during the inspection.
- 4.1.2. Evaluate logistics airlift units with nuclear weapons transport missions by observing loading, transporting, unloading, and custody transfer procedures of representative types of weapons. The team may conduct the inspection (other than an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection) during missions involving war reserve (WR) weapons. The inspection team will not require the unit to perform additional weapon handling operations if a WR mission is evaluated and rated at least Satisfactory.
- 4.1.3. Except in an actual emergency, do not use an inspector as part of a unit's Two-Person Concept Team (see AFI 91-104, *Nuclear Surety Tamper Control and Detection Programs* [formerly AFR 127-4]) during an inspection. During airlift missions and when unescorted entry to restricted areas is authorized, two properly cleared inspectors certified under the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) may form their own Two-Person Concept team.
- 4.1.4. Determine a unit's technical proficiency by using WR weapons scheduled for normal maintenance, loading, unloading, or logistics movement. Use training weapons or weapon system simulators for inspections when WR assets are not available.
- 4.1.5. Include in NSI report only deficiencies that directly affect the safety, security, or reliability of a nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon system. Report other deficiencies in a memorandum of minor deficiencies or in a QAFA report.

4.2. Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI). Designed to evaluate a unit's readiness to assume or resume a nuclear mission or to evaluate and certify new or significantly modified maintenance and storage facilities (see table A3.1), and significant changes to weapons systems or portions thereof. Use training weapons to conduct an INSI before WR weapons are placed at the unit or facility.

- 4.2.1. The inspection team evaluates a unit's capability to safely and reliably receive, store, transport, secure, maintain, load, mate, and render safe nuclear weapons or reentry systems. Aircrews and missile launch crews must demonstrate their

knowledge of weapon acceptance procedures, nuclear weapon system safety rules, and nuclear weapon control order handling and authentication procedures. The inspection team also examines plans and resources for implementing an advanced readiness posture.

4.2.2. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams and nuclear logistics airlift units must receive an INSI before being considered capable of supporting a nuclear mission.

4.2.3. Phased INSIs may be conducted when large-scale, time-consuming efforts are involved. If phased INSIs are conducted, the responsible MAJCOM prepares an inspection plan to make sure all required areas are initially inspected and sends it to HQ AFSA/SENS for approval. A ready rating is assigned before conducting each phase of nuclear operations. After completing all phases, a follow-up inspection is conducted after the unit receives a ready rating and receives nuclear weapons. If all the areas listed in paragraph 4.5.2 are evaluated during phased INSIs, the MAJCOM may conduct a follow-up NSI. If a phased INSI is conducted and results are sufficient, the 18-month period begins after the first phase is completed.

4.3. Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI). Designed to evaluate a unit's capability to manage nuclear resources while complying with all nuclear surety standards (see applicable areas listed in paragraph 4.5.2). An NSI may be combined with other MAJCOM inspections to reduce the number of unit inspections. Where two or more MAJCOMs share nuclear surety responsibilities at one base, multicommand NSIs are encouraged to make sure host-tenant responsibilities are fully assessed and properly integrated. Either the host or tenant MAJCOM may perform these inspections with the concurrence of, and augmentation from, the other MAJCOM.

4.3.1. Frequency of MAJCOM NSIs.

4.3.1.1. Conduct an NSI of each nuclear-capable unit at least every 18 months. Complete all inspection requirements within 18 months after completing the last NSI. Complete all phases within a 120-calendar-day period. Provide the NSI rating when all phases are completed.

4.3.1.1.1. Selected units will receive a minimum-notice inspection that will key on a unit's ability to provide a secure environment consistent with its nuclear mission. Notice will be sent by message to units with information copies to HQ USAF/SEC, SAF/IGI, and HQ USAF/SENS.

4.3.1.2. If necessary, conduct a follow-up NSI within 90 to 180 calendar days after a new unit successfully completes an INSI and receives nuclear weapons. EOD teams, nuclear airlift units, and certification of new or modified facilities do not require this follow-up NSI.

4.3.1.3. Conduct a reinspection (NSI or LNSI) within 90 calendar days for units rated Unsatisfactory that do not achieve a Marginal rating on a reinspection.

4.3.2. For units rated Unsatisfactory that do not achieve a Marginal on a reinspection, MAJCOM commanders must approve units use of nuclear weapons. MAJCOMs ensure nuclear weapons are maintained reliably and afforded a safe and secure environment until restrictions are removed by a reinspection.

4.4. Limited Nuclear Surety Inspection (LNSI). Limited in scope and does not evaluate all NSI areas applicable to the unit. Conducted for a variety of reasons (see table A3.1) and does not alter the 18-month NSI requirement.

4.4.1. MAJCOMs conduct LNSIs to:

- Inspect one or more areas designated by the MAJCOM commander or IG.
- Reinspect a unit in any area that was rated Unsatisfactory during an NSI.
- Certify a unit with a nuclear contingency mission before deployment. Conducted only if the unit has previously received an INSI or NSI and the 18-month certification period has not expired. If the certification period has expired, conduct an INSI (see table A3.1, Item 6). MAJCOM performs a separate LNSI to evaluate areas listed in paragraph 4.5.2 not evaluated during a recent DNSI. The 18-month inspection requirement starts when the DNSI is completed.

4.4.2. AFSA/SEN conducts LNSIs to:

- Evaluate nuclear logistics airlift missions and the support provided these missions. These are no-notice inspections. MAJCOM inspection teams receive the locations and dates of the LNSI through Trusted Agent channels.
- Evaluate (as notice or no-notice inspections) those areas designated by the HQ USAF/SE, HQ AFSA/CC, Director of Nuclear Surety, or SAF/IG.
- Review deficiencies identified during previous Air Force NSIs or FCDSWA DNSIs.
- Select units to be inspected and coordinate with the MAJCOM to avoid scheduling conflicts.
- Report major deficiencies found during these inspections to the unit and the MAJCOM IG. Send information copies to HQ USAF/SE.

4.5. Nuclear Inspection Areas and Criteria. Designed to address all functional areas or operations. During NSIs, inspect all areas of a unit's mission. During LNSIs and INSIs, selected areas may be inspected.

4.5.1. Pass or Fail Criteria. Consider carefully all NSI pass and fail criteria when assessing any deficiency (see TO 11N-25-1 for additional information). A deficiency in one or more of the following areas results in an overall rating of Unsatisfactory for the entire inspection:

- Nuclear Safety
- Nuclear Security
- System Reliability
- Access Deficiencies
- Resource Availability
- Overall Performance. Failure will result from a number of deficiencies or performance indicating a lack of competence or disregard for prescribed procedures.

4.5.1.1. Areas rated Unsatisfactory under pass-fail criteria must be reinspected to Marginal prior to inspection team departure. If not reinspected to Marginal, discontinue that portion of the operation until reinspected or corrective measures are implemented and approved by the MAJCOM commander pending reinspection.

4.5.2. Nuclear Surety Inspection Areas. Inspectors consider the six pass or fail criteria when assessing deficiencies. An Unsatisfactory rating in one of the following areas does not automatically result in an overall unit rating of Unsatisfactory unless it violates the pass-fail criteria.

4.5.2.1. Program Management. Evaluate leadership, guidance, and attitude of unit commander and key supervisors. Determine whether deficiencies are the result of individual error or reflect management or supervisory shortcomings.

4.5.2.2. Program Administration. Evaluate:

- Availability and currency of required guidance.
- Elimination of approved waivers, exemptions, deviations, and exceptions.
- Currency and adequacy of unit plans, operating orders, and instructions pertaining to nuclear surety.
- Host-tenant support agreements, including the munitions support squadron (MUNSS) liaison officer.
- Loading and services management to include loading standardization, certification, training programs and schedules, adequacy of maintenance plans, and, for certain non-US delivery aircraft, status, certification procedures and records.
- Reentry system mating management.
- Maintenance management of nuclear weapons, bombs, and missiles.

4.5.2.3. Nuclear Control Order Procedures. Evaluates command post, aircrew, and missile crew responses to nuclear control orders.

4.5.2.4. Emergency Evacuation, Denial, and Command Disablement. Evaluate Emergency Evacuation, Denial, and Command Disablement.

4.5.2.5. Technical Operations. Evaluate each type of assigned weapon to assess safety, reliability, and technical performance (see TO 11N-25-1, table 2-7).

4.5.2.6. Nuclear Weapon Loading and Mating. Evaluate:

- Ability to safely and reliably load aircraft.
- Effect on force generation, launch, and delivery to target.
- Weapon release system.

For US custodial units supporting non-US delivery organizations, include the US technical load monitor activity.

4.5.2.7. Reentry System Mating in Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Units. Evaluate team adherence to technical data and overall safety and reliability of the weapon system.

4.5.2.8. EOD. Evaluate training, certification, publications, tools, equipment, and technical operations.

4.5.2.9. Use Control. Evaluate applicable Permissive Action Link, Command Disablement System, and Active Protection System operations.

4.5.2.10. Tools, Test, and Handling Equipment. Examine for condition, nuclear certification, calibration status, load test, and other applicable areas.

4.5.2.11. Storage Practices. Examine at least 50 percent of the assets in igloo storage and a minimum of 25 percent of assets in weapon storage vaults and depots. Conduct spot inspections of weapons coded for retirement to ensure they are stored in a safe condition and are properly identified as being retired assets.

4.5.2.12. Condition of Facilities. Evaluate:

- Condition of storage, maintenance, loading, or launch facilities.
- Roads in storage areas and between storage and loading or missile launch areas.
- Ground support equipment.
- Communications-computer systems.
- Utilities.
- Lightning protection systems.

4.5.2.13. Explosives and Active Material Limits. (Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory rating only.) Evaluate compliance with limits on explosives and active materials during storage, maintenance, and transportation.

4.5.2.14. Security Forces Readiness. Evaluate unit's ability to provide a secure environment for nuclear resources during normal and advanced readiness postures in compliance with security requirements as defined in DoD, Joint, Air Force, and MAJCOM directives.

- Emergencies. Use scenarios to judge the effectiveness of security force reaction to emergencies, including response force arrival to nuclear areas.
- Normal Security. Evaluate physical security systems for compliance, approved deviations, and compensatory measures; entry control procedures and systems; competence of security personnel; and base-level response to terrorist attack.
- Advanced Readiness. Evaluate transition to advanced security postures and the security provided nuclear assets in storage; on alert; and during breakout, convoy, and loading operations. In overseas areas, evaluate the security provided during emergency evacuation and command disablement exercises.

4.5.2.14.1. Normal Security. Evaluate:

- Physical security systems for compliance, approved deviations, and compensatory measures.
- Entry control procedures and systems.
- Competence of security personnel.
- Base-level response to terrorist attack. When a combined ORI/NSI is conducted, a base-level terrorist attack exercise need not be conducted during the NSI portion if a similar exercise was conducted during the ORI and the team chief is satisfied with the results.

4.5.2.15. Nuclear Surety Program. Evaluate compliance, programs, and management.

4.5.2.16. Nuclear Ordnance Commodity Management. Evaluate the supply management of nuclear ordnance; WR major assemblies; and related nuclear weapon material for positive accounting, custodial control, and status reporting.

4.5.2.17. Personnel Reliability Program. Evaluate involved agencies for spirit and intent as well as compliance. Rate PRP Unsatisfactory if a unit fails to:

- Screen personnel adequately, resulting in an unqualified person being certified.
- Inform commander of potentially disqualifying information which, if known, would have resulted in decertification.
- Decertify personnel.
- Prevent noncertified individuals from performing tasks requiring certification.

4.5.2.18. Logistics Movement. Evaluate the capability to transfer weapons from bolsters or racks to transport trailers, convoy operations (to include operational movements to or from launch facilities), and weapon movement activities in a safe, secure, and reliable manner. Logistics airlift units must demonstrate the ability to safely and properly load, transport, unload, and transfer custody of weapons.

4.5.2.19. Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) Support. Evaluate PNAF support plans, security support, and logistics movement (see AFI 11-204).

4.6. Nuclear Inspection Rating System. Use the 5-level rating system. Assign ratings for the overall inspection, each applicable evaluated area, phased NSIs upon completing all phases, phased INSIs upon completing each phase, and LNSIs upon completing the inspection. Assign Ready or Not Ready ratings for phased INSIs.

4.7. Reinspection of Deficient Areas. MAJCOM uses the following guidance to determine its reinspection policy:

4.7.1. Reinspect if the overall inspection rating is Unsatisfactory.

4.7.2. Conduct the reinspection within 90 calendar days of the failed inspection.

4.7.3. Before terminating the inspection, the team chief may conduct an on-the-spot reinspection of the deficient areas that caused or contributed to an Unsatisfactory rating. If a reinspection is conducted, the message report and the formal report must reflect both the original and reinspection ratings. An immediate reinspection indicates that the deficiency is sufficiently corrected to permit operations and a 90-calendar-day follow-up inspection is not required. The following apply when determining if an on-the-spot reinspection is appropriate:

- Do not reinspect if the failure is due to a systemic problem or a general lack of proficiency within the unit.
- Do not reinspect if suspension of nuclear weapon operations is in the best interest of nuclear safety, security, or reliability.
- Reinspect if the Unsatisfactory rating was caused by an individual's error and training was adequate.
- Consider reinspection if the Unsatisfactory rating was caused by an administrative error that can be resolved quickly and easily; for example, improper guidance or procedure in a unit instruction, operations plan, or operations order.

4.7.4. Do not give a rating higher than Marginal for on-the-spot reinspections.

4.7.5. Do not assign a reinspection rating higher than Satisfactory for the follow-up inspection conducted within 90 calendar days.

4.8. Actions on Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA) Inspection Reports.

4.8.1. Units coordinate replies to DNSI and Surveillance Inspection (SI) reports through the appropriate MAJCOM functional manager to arrive at HQ AFSA/SENS at least 30 days before the date due to DSWA (as shown on the formal DSWA report). Take corrective action based on the field report provided by the DSWA team at the time of the DNSI or SI.

4.8.2. With an overall Unsatisfactory DNSI rating, the MAJCOM must evaluate the results and the unit's status to determine if the procedures of paragraph 4.3.2 should be invoked. MAJCOM must notify HQ AFSA/SENS of the evaluation results within 48 hours (by priority message) after the DSWA inspection is completed.

4.9. Nuclear Inspection Reports. Provide the results of NSIs in message and formal report formats. Include a paragraph reference from the applicable DoD or Air Force regulation or technical order for deficiencies cited in all reports. LNSIs and INSIs are normally reported only by message.

4.9.1. Message Reports. Inspection teams report the results of an NSI, LNSI, and INSI in the format shown in attachments 3 and 4. Do not combine NSI, LNSI, and INSI message reports with other inspection message reports. Use priority precedence when reporting Unsatisfactory (NSI and LNSI) or Not Ready (INSI) ratings. Even during MINIMIZE, submit an inspection message if the unit is found Not Ready, Unsatisfactory, or has LIMFACs or major deficiencies. Include a description of the LIMFACs and major deficiencies (see attachment 1) and describe the unit's corrective actions in detail. Deficiencies that are corrected before the inspection is completed do not require processing according to paragraph 4.9.3.

4.9.2. Extract Report. Inspecting team extracts LIMFACs, significant deficiencies, or potentially serious problems that are the responsibility of a support activity outside the MAJCOM. Send an Extract Report (see attachment 3) as follows:

- An action copy to the responsible MAJCOM IG and applicable staff agency.
- Information copies to the responsible organization, its intermediate headquarters, and basic report addressees.

4.9.3. Procedural Responsibility. MAJCOMs establish procedures for processing, tracking, and correcting identified serious deficiencies.

4.9.4. Formal NSI Report. The MAJCOM inspection team:

- Gives enough information to the unit commander to allow corrective action to be taken if the formal NSI report will be prepared after the inspection team departs.
- Prepares the formal NSI report according to MAJCOM directives. In addition to addressees specified by the MAJCOM, sends copies of this report to HQ AFSA/SENS, HQ USAF/SE, HQ AFSPA/SPSS, SAF/IG, and FCDSWA/FCI according to TO 11N-25-1.
- Sends the entire report, or those parts that report on the supporting unit's functions, to the MAJCOM that provided support.

RICHARD T. SWOPE, Lt General, USAF
The Inspector General

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES, ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND TERMS

References

AFI 10-201, *Status of Resources and Training Systems (SORTS)* (formerly AFR 55-15)
 AFI 10-210, *Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force (BEEF) Program* (formerly AFR 93-3)
 AFI 10-211, *Contingency Response Planning* (formerly AFR 93-2)
 AFI 10-215, *Personnel Support for Contingency Operations (PERSCO)* (formerly AFR 35-20)
 AFI 10-403, *Deployment Planning* (formerly AFR 28-4)
 AFJI 11-204, *Operational Procedures for Aircraft Carrying Hazardous Material* (formerly AFR 55-14)
 AFI 13-201, *Reducing Flight Disturbances* (formerly AFR 55-34)
 AFI 14-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities* (formerly AFR 200-19)
 AFI 31-101, *Air Force Physical Security Program* (formerly AFRs 207-1, 207-2, 207-4, 207-5, 207-6, 207-8, 207-21, and 207-23)
 AFI 31-401, *Information Security Program Regulation* (formerly AFR 205-1)
 AFI 36-2105, *Officer Classification* (formerly AFR 36-1)
 AFI 36-2226, *Combat Arms Training and Maintenance Program* (formerly AFR 50-36)
 AFI 36-3002, *Casualty Services* (formerly AFR 30-25)
 AFI 37-131, *Freedom of Information Act Program* (formerly AFR 4-33)
 AFI 48-119, *Environmental Pollution Monitoring* (formerly AFR 19-7)
 AFI 51-201, *Military Justice Code* (formerly AFRs 111-1, 111-2, 111-3, 111-5, 111-7, and 111-17)
 AFI 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints* (formerly AFRs 20-68, 120-3, 120-4, 123-2, and 123-11)
 AFI 91-104, *Nuclear Surety Tamper Control and Detection Programs* (formerly AFR 122-4)
 AFI 91-204, *Investigating and Reporting Mishaps* (formerly AFR 127-4)
 AFMAN 23-110, Vol II, Part 2, *USAF Standard Base Supply System* (formerly AFM 67-1, volume II, part 2)
 AFR 90-2, *Inspector General-The Inspection System*
 AFRP 90-1, *TIG Brief*
 DoDD 3150.2, *DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program*
 DoDD 5240.1, *DoD Intelligence Activities*
 DoDR 5240.1-R, *Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect US Persons*
 Executive Order 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*
 Joint Publication 1-03.3, *Joint Reporting Status*
 TO 11N-25-1, *DoD Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection System*
 WMP 1, *War Mobilization Plan, Volume 1*

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAFES—Army and Air Force Exchange System
ABD—Air Base Defense
ACC—Air Combat Command
ADPE—Advanced Data Processing Equipment
AF—Air Force
AFAA—Air Force Audit Agency
AFCOMS—Air Force Commissary Service
AFI—Air Force Instruction
AFIA—Air Force Inspection Agency
AFPC—Air Force Personnel Center
AFOSI—Air Force Office of Special Investigations
AFPD—Air Force Policy Directive
AFR—Air Force Regulation
AFRES—Air Force Reserve
AICUZ—Air Installation Compatible Use Zone
AMR—Acquisition Management Review
ANG—Air National Guard
AOCB—Acquisition Oversight Coordination Board
ATO—Air Tasking Order
ATSD (IO)—Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Intelligence Oversight

AUTODIN–Automatic Digital Network
BCE–Base Civil Engineer
BDOC–Base Defense Operations Center
BEE–Bioenvironmental Engineer
BEEF–Base Engineer Emergency Force
BMP–Base Mobility Plan
BSX–Base Staff Exercise
C4–Command, Control, Communications, and Computers
C4I –Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
CATEX–Categorical Exclusion
CCC–Common-Core Criteria
CE–Civil Engineer
CEM–Contingency, Exercise, and Mobility
CERCLA Liability Act–Comprehensive Environmental Restoration, Compensation and
COMPES System–Contingency Operation/Mobility Planning and Execution
COMPUSEC–Computer Security
COMSEC–Communications Security
CONUS–Continental United States
CS–Combat Support
CSAF–Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
CSAI–Contracted Support Activities Inspections
CSF–CONUS Sustaining Force
DCS–Deputy Chiefs of Staff
DERA–Defense Environmental Restoration Account
DMR–Discharge Monitoring Reports
DSWA–Defense Special Weapons Agency
DNSI–Defense Nuclear Surety Inspections
DOC–Designed Operational Capability
DoD–Department of Defense
DoD-IG–DoD, Inspector General
DP–Personnel
DPU–Deployment Processing Unit
DRD–Deployment Requirements Document
DRU–Direct Reporting Unit
EAB–Emergency Actions Book
EC–Equipment Custodian
ECAMP Program–Environmental Compliance Assessment and Management
EEIC–Element of Expense Investment Codes
EHS–Extremely Hazardous Substances
EIAP–Environmental Impact Analysis Process
EIS–Environmental Impact Statement
EOD–Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPA–Environmental Protection Agency
EPC–Environmental Protection Committee
FARE–Food and Readiness
FCDSWA–Field Command, Defense Special Weapons Agency
FMR–Field Management Review
FOA–Field Operating Agency
FONSI–Findings of No Significant Action
FOUO–For Official Use Only
FRAGORD–Fragmentary Order
GDFC–Ground Defense Force Commander
GOCO–Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated
GSORTS–Global Status of Resources and Training System
HHQ–Higher Headquarters
HTMA–Hazardous Material Transportation Act

HQ AFIA—Headquarters Air Force Inspection Agency
HQ AFIA/CC—HQ AFIA, Commander
HQ AFIA/CSV—HQ AFIA, Inspection Support Division
HQ AFIA/FI—HQ AFIA, Field Inspection Directorate
HQ AFIA/SG—HQ AFIA, Medical Directorate
HQ AFSA—Headquarters Air Force Safety Agency
HQ AFSA/CC—HQ AFSA, Commander
HQ AFSA/SEN—HQ AFSA, Nuclear Safety Directorate
HQ AFSPA—Headquarters Air Force Security Police Agency
HQ USAF—Headquarters United States Air Force
HQ USAF/DPXC—HQ USAF, DCS Personnel, Readiness Division
HQ USAF/IN—HQ USAF, DCS Intelligence
HQ USAF/SE—HQ USAF, DCS Safety
HQ USAF/SEP—HQ USAF/SE, Programs
HQ USAF/SG—HQ USAF, Surgeon General
HQ USAF/XO—HQ USAF, DCS, Plans and Operations
HSI—Health Services Inspections
IG—Inspector General
IGDI—Inspector General Directed Investigation
IMA—Individual Mobilization Augmentees
IMO—Installation Mobility Officer
INSI—Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection
IO—Intelligence Oversight
IWTP—Industrial Wastewater Treatment Plant
JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff
JQS—Job Qualification Standard
LEPC—Local Emergency Planning Committee
LIMFAC—Limiting Factor
LNSI—Limited Nuclear Surety Inspection
LOAC—Law of Armed Conflict
LOGDET—Logistics Detail
MAJCOM—Major Command
MANFOR—Manpower Force Element Listing
MANPER-B—Manpower and Personnel Base-level
MANPER-M—MAJCOM Level Manpower/Personnel Module
MC&G—Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy
MDX—Manpower Data Extract
MFH—Military Family Housing
MHE—Materials Handling Equipment
MILCON—Military Construction
MIS—Management Information System
MMX—Multi-MAJCOM Exercise
MOA—Memorandum of Agreement
MOB—Main Operating Base
MOS—Minimum Operating Strip
MOU—Memorandum of Understanding
MPF—Military Personnel Flight
MQAFA—MAJCOM Quality Air Force Assessment
MSSQ—Mission Support Squadron
MTF—Medical Treatment Facilities
MUNSS—Munitions Support Squadron
MWRS—Morale, Welfare, Recreation, and Services
NAF—Numbered Air Force
NBC—Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
NMC—Not Mission Capable
NPDES—National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System

NPL–National Priorities List
NSI–Nuclear Surety Inspection
O&M–Operation and Maintenance
OHSPC–Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency
OPLAN–Operation Plan
OPORD–Operation Order
OPR–Office of Primary Responsibility
OPSEC–Operations Security
ORI–Operational Readiness Inspection
OSHA–Occupational Safety and Health Act
OTSI–Over-the-Shoulder Inspection
PACS–Public and Community Service
PAK–Personnel Accountability Kit
PCB–Polychlorinated Biphenols
pci/L–Parts Per Cubic Inch Per Liter
PDS–Personnel Data System
PE–Program Element
PERSCO–Personnel Support for Contingency Operations
PFO–Prime FARE Operations
PNAF–Prime Nuclear Airlift Force
POM–Program Objective Memorandum
PRC–Personnel Readiness Center
PRF–Personnel Resource File
Prime BEEF–Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force
Prime FARE–Prime Food and Readiness
Prime RIBS–Prime Readiness in Base Support
PRP–Personnel Reliability Program
PSRS/PRC–Personnel Systems and Readiness Section/Personnel Readiness Center
PT–Personnel Support for Contingency Operations Team
QAFA–Quality Air Force Assessment
RC/CC–Responsibility Center/Cost Center
RCRA/HSWA–Resource Conversion and Recovery Act and Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments
RIBS–Readiness in Base Support
ROD–Records of Decision
ROE–Rules of Engagement
SAF–Secretary of the Air Force
SAF/GC–SAF, General Counsel
SAF/IG–SAF, Inspector General
SAF/IGI–SAF/IG, Director of Inspections
SAR–Search and Rescue
SECAF–Secretary of the Air Force
SI–Surveillance Inspection
SII–Special Interest Item
SMR–Special Management Review
SMS–Strategic Mission Support
SMSF–Strategic Mission Support Forces
SORTS–Status of Resources and Training System
SPCC–Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasures
SRC–Survival Recovery Center
SVS–Services
TAP–Transition Assistance Programs
TERA–Temporary Early Retirement Act
TO–Technical Order
UMT–Unit Mobility Tasking
US–United States
UTC–Unit Type Code

UXO—Unexploded Ordnance

VMET—Verification of Military Experience and Training

WDR—War Damage Repair

WMP—War and Mobilization Plan

WR—War Reserve

WWTP—Wastewater Treatment Plant

Terms

★**Acquisition Oversight Coordination Board (AOCB)**—Determines oversight requirements and reduces oversight burden by integrating acquisition reviews and audits within the Air Force. The Air Force Audit Agency, Air Force Inspection Agency, and Air Force Materiel Command Inspector General comprise the AOCB. The AOCB holds annual topic calls to identify acquisition topics of greatest importance to Air Force leaders.

Assess—To appraise or evaluate. Independent evaluation of the efficiency or effectiveness of a policy, process, or outcome performed by an organization which did not develop the policy or process and does not affect outcome.

Access Deficiencies—Access occurs when an unauthorized individual(s) has close proximity to a nuclear weapon, weapon system, or critical component allowing compromise of the weapon, system, or component. Consider these deficiencies when evaluating all other areas. Only Two-Person Concept teams are permitted in no-lone zones.

Common-Core Criteria (CCC)—Criteria that establishes an Air Force-wide common standard for evaluation of like units or organizations.

Excellent—The grade given to indicate performance or operation exceeds mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out in a superior manner. Resources and programs are very efficiently managed and relatively free of deficiencies.

Inspector General Directed Investigation (IGDI)—The highest-priority investigation conducted by The Inspector General.

Limiting Factor (LIMFAC)—A factor or condition that, either temporarily or permanently, impedes mission accomplishment. Illustrative examples are transportation network deficiencies, lack of in-place facilities, malpositioned forces or materiel, extreme climatic conditions, distance, transit or overflight rights, political conditions, etc.

Marginal—The grade given to indicate performance or operation does not meet some mission requirements. Procedures and activities are not carried out in an efficient manner. Resources and programs are not efficiently managed. Deficiencies exist that impede or limit mission accomplishment.

Minimum Notice—Inspection notice given to a unit not less than 72 hours but not greater than 7 days prior to the inspection.

Nuclear-Capable Unit—A wing, group, squadron, or other designated element that does not necessarily possess nuclear weapons but has a mission to receive, store, handle, test, maintain, transport, load and unload, mate and demate, stand alert, or perform strike missions with nuclear bombs or warheads. An Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team with a nuclear mission (E-1 and E-2 units only) is a nuclear-capable unit. US custodial units supporting non-US delivery organizations are nuclear-capable units.

Nuclear Safety—Requirements and procedures needed to provide a safe environment for nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon systems, and critical components throughout the stockpile-to-target sequence. A deficiency that could lead to physical damage, explosion, radioactive contamination, or unintentional or unauthorized operation of any part of the arming and firing system.

Nuclear Security—Requirements and procedures required to secure nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons systems, and critical components by host and tenant agencies. Failure results if the unit does not provide required security.

Operational Readiness Inspection—All units with a wartime mission are evaluated on their operational readiness or their ability to conduct combat operations in wartime. The major command evaluates the unit on how well it can respond, employ forces, provide mission support, and survive and operate in a combat environment.

Outstanding—The grade given to indicate performance or operation far exceeds mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out in a far superior manner. Resources and programs are very efficiently managed and are of exceptional merit. Few, if any, deficiencies exist.

Over-The-Shoulder Inspection (OTSI)—Performed by inspectors from a higher echelon of command to evaluate the effectiveness of a subordinate command inspection.

Oversight—The watchful management or supervision of the implementation of policy performed by the agency responsible for development of that policy.

Readiness—The ability of US military forces to fight and meet the demands of the national military strategy. Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct but interrelated levels:

- a. *Unit Readiness*—The ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed.
- b. *Joint Readiness*—The combatant commander's ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute his assigned missions.

Resource Availability—Includes personnel, equipment, or authorized repair parts. Failure results from shortages within the unit's control, preventing required nuclear weapon technical operations.

Satisfactory—The grade given to indicate performance or operation meets mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out in an effective and competent manner. Resources and programs are efficiently managed. Minor deficiencies may exist but do not impede or limit mission accomplishment.

System Reliability—Requirements and technical or operational procedures ensuring an assembled nuclear weapon system functions as designed. Failure results if a deficiency causes a weapon to malfunction.

Unsatisfactory—The grade given to indicate performance or operation does not meet mission requirements. Procedures and activities are not carried out in an adequate manner. Resources and programs are not adequately managed. Significant deficiencies exist that preclude or seriously limit mission accomplishment.

MESSAGE FORMAT FOR NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTIONS

FROM: (MAJCOM) IG TEAM (Base and Functional Address Symbol)

TO: (MAJCOM) (Base)//CC/(Appropriate Staff)//

(Numbered Air Force, if applicable) (Base)//CC//

(Air Division, if applicable) (Base)//CC//

(Wing, Group, or Squadron) (Base)//CC//

INFO: HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//SE/SPO/LGMW//

HQ AFSPA KIRTLAND AFB NM//SPS//

HQ AFSA KIRTLAND AFB NM//CC/SENS//

HQ AFIA KIRTLAND AFB NM//CC//

OSAF WASHINGTON DC//IG//

(Security classification) - (FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA - ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

1954, if applicable) - PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT--REF AFI 90-201

(NOTE: Assign a classification according to message content; simply associating an INSI, NSI, or LNSI with specific units is normally unclassified. Refer to applicable classification guides for specific guidance.)

SUBJECT: INITIAL NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTION (INSI) REPORT

NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTION (NSI) REPORT

LIMITED NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTION (LNSI) REPORT

(Use appropriate subject.)

1. REFERENCE: (Include all applicable documents; e.g., for reinspections, refer to the message report and date of the previous inspection.)

2. INSPECTION AUTHORITY: THE (MAJCOM) IG TEAM CONDUCTED AN (INSI, NSI, or LNSI) OF THE (unit and base) ON (inclusive dates) ACCORDING TO AFI 90-201. THE INSPECTION TEAM CHIEF WAS (grade and name).

3. SYSTEMS INSPECTED AND AREAS OBSERVED: (Identify each weapon system, e.g., W62/MK 12.) THE TECHNICAL OPERATION(S) OBSERVED CORRESPOND TO AFI 90-201 AND THE (MAJCOM) SUPPLEMENT. (Indicate war reserve, e.g., -1A on B61 WR; or training unit, e.g., parachute exchange on B43 TR. Give the reason for omitting any technical operations required in TO 11N-25-1, table 2-7. State specific EOD operations observed; e.g., render safe procedures on specific type of weapon. If another unit or command was responsible for EOD or security support, include the following: THE INSPECTION INCLUDED AN EVALUATION OF THE TECHNICAL (EOD or SECURITY) SUPPORT PROVIDED BY (unit, base, and command). (Report findings in paragraphs 5 and 6 below, if applicable.)

4. UNIT INSPECTION RATING: (For an INSI: READY or NOT READY; for an NSI or LNSI: OUTSTANDING, EXCELLENT, SATISFACTORY, MARGINAL, or UNSATISFACTORY.)

5. LIMITING FACTORS: (If any, describe each problem in detail and indicate its effect on the unit mission. Identify the functional manager responsible for corrective action and indicate if the support organization or higher command failed to provide required support. Include appropriate references and describe corrective action taken during the inspection.)
6. MAJOR DEFICIENCIES: (If any, describe as in paragraph 5 above. Identify any deficiency that has a major impact on nuclear surety or is a factor in a less than Satisfactory rating. Include appropriate references and describe any corrective action taken during the inspection.)
7. OTHER SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION: (Include MAJCOM special subjects related to nuclear surety that were evaluated. Provide concurrence or nonconcurrence statements from DSWA or AFSA for SIs or LNSIs.
8. PROCESSING OF REPORT: (Report processing is required, when a major deficiency is not corrected before the inspection is completed or when the corrective action is an interim measure. If required, specify items to be answered.)

MESSAGE FORMAT (EXTRACT) FOR NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTIONS

FROM: (MAJCOM) IG TEAM (Base and Functional Address Symbol)

TO: (MAJCOM) (Base)//CC/(Appropriate Staff)//

(Numbered Air Force, if applicable) (Base)//CC//

(Air Division, if applicable) (Base)//CC//

(Wing, Group, or Squadron) (Base)//CC//

INFO: HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//SE/SPO/LGMW//

OSAF WASHINGTON DC//IG//

HQ AFSPA KIRTLAND AFB NM//SPS//

HQ AFSA KIRTLAND AFB NM//CC/SENS//

HQ AFIA KIRTLAND AFB NM//CC//

(Security classification) - (FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA - ATOMIC

ENERGY ACT 1954, if applicable) - PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT--REF AFI 90-201

SUBJECT: INITIAL NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTION (INSI) EXTRACT REPORT

NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTION (NSI) EXTRACT REPORT

LIMITED NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTION (LNSI) EXTRACT REPORT

(Use appropriate subject.)

1. REFERENCE: (Include all applicable documents.)

2. THIS EXTRACT REPORT COVERS (LIMITING FACTORS or MAJOR DEFICIENCIES) NOTED DURING AN (INSI, NSI, or LNSI) OF THE (unit and base) CONDUCTED ON (inclusive dates) ACCORDING TO AFI 90-201. THE INSPECTION TEAM CHIEF WAS (grade and name).

3. THE (unit) IS A TENANT ON (base). AS OUTLINED IN THE SUPPORT AGREEMENT (give a description of the agreement and the date), THE (organization) WAS RATED (rating). (Include the following, if applicable): THE (organization) HAS NOT FURNISHED ADEQUATE SUPPORT, WHICH RESULTED IN THE FOLLOWING (LIMITING FACTORS or MAJOR DEFICIENCIES): (Describe the limiting factors or major deficiencies; identify the functional manager responsible for corrective action; and provide appropriate references.)

4. (Include remarks, if any.) (If applicable, provide the name of the representative from the MAJCOM not conducting the inspection as follows): THE (MAJCOM) REPRESENTATIVE (name) (CONCURRED or NONCONCURRED) WITH THIS EXTRACT REPORT.

5. PROCESSING OF THIS REPORT ACCORDING TO AFI 90-201, PARAGRAPH 11, (IS/IS NOT) REQUIRED.

Table A3.1. Inspection Requirements for Major Changes.

I T E M	A	B	C	D	E
	Type of change	Primary Unit Functions Affected	Type of Inspection	When Inspected	Remarks
1	Assuming or resuming nuclear mission or relocation of the unit.	All unit functions.	INSI	Before introducing weapons into the unit.	
2	Certifying new or significantly modified maintenance or storage facilities.	Appropriate inspection areas.		Before introducing weapons into the new or modified facility.	INSI may be included as part of a scheduled NSI. Evaluate design, construction, security policies, and procedures (see notes 1 and 2).
3	Activating new noncombat delivery squadron (PNAF).	Appropriate wing and squadron functions.		Before conducting any operations involving nuclear weapons.	When changing PNAF squadrons within a wing, wing agencies are reevaluated during the INSI if their support functions remain unchanged by the squadron conversion.
4	New weapon type.	Maintenance, loading, supply, and EOD.		Before receiving the first new weapon.	INSI may be included as part of a scheduled NSI.
5	New type of delivery system.	Loading or mating and EOD.		Before loading or mating to new delivery system.	INSI may be included as part of a scheduled NSI.
6	Certifying or recertifying a unit assigned a contingency nuclear mission.	Applicable functions and programs.	INSI or LNSI (see note 3)	Before conducting any operations involving nuclear weapons.	If the unit deploys and handles war reserve weapons during exercises, accomplish the inspection 90 calendar days before deployment.

NOTES:

1. An INSI may be conducted on one or more facilities that are typical of new construction at a base. If no other similar structures or facilities are modified after the INSI of typical structures, an inspection of other structures or facilities is not required. If new structures or facilities are located in a specific area (alert area or weapons storage area) and all of the area is affected, inspect the entire area after construction is completed.

2. An INSI of new or significantly modified security intrusion detection systems is required after satisfactory completion of the 30-day sensor test. MAJCOM/IG or, when delegated, MAJCOM/SP must certify the system for operational use.

3. An INSI is required if the unit is being certified for the first time for its contingency nuclear mission or if the 18-month certification is expired. An LNSI may be conducted (in lieu of an NSI) if the unit had an NSI within 18 months, but a subordinate unit requires certification. (*EXAMPLE:* A wing with two combat delivery squadrons tasked for a contingency nuclear capability receives an INSI, but only one of its two squadrons is certified. An LNSI may be accomplished if the second combat delivery squadron is subsequently tasked to demonstrate capability and the required certification inspection occurs within 18 months of the wing's last inspection. Under these circumstances, the MAJCOM inspection team must decide whether to accomplish an LNSI or NSI.

COMMON-CORE CRITERIA (CCC)
AREAS EVALUATED DURING ALL PHASES

A4.1. Application. This attachment lists those CCC evaluated during all phases of an inspection or assessment.

A4.2. Inspected Areas.

A4.2.1. Threat. Is the unit able to implement and sustain appropriate measures to meet changing threat conditions?

A4.2.2. Safety. Was safety emphasized throughout the exercise?

A4.2.3. Security.

- Were adequate security measures employed throughout the exercise?
- Were OPSEC procedures incorporated into plans and followed throughout the exercise?
- Were proper COMSEC materials available, as specified in tasked Operations Plans, to ensure mission accomplishment?
- Were COMSEC, COMPUSEC, and other measures employed to deny the enemy information?

A4.2.4. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C⁴I). Were C⁴I operations effective?

A4.2.5. Training. Are units properly trained and equipped to perform wartime duties?

COMMON-CORE CRITERIA (CCC)
AREAS EVALUATED IN A SPECIFIC MAJOR GRADING CATEGORY

A5.1. Application. The following questions and statements represent key processes, procedures, and requirements MAJCOMs should evaluate (as applicable) to their units' missions. MAJCOMs can supplement this general guidance as required.

A5.2. Area--Initial Response.

A5.2.1 Subarea--Command and Control.

- Is the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) reporting timely, accurate, and properly classified?
- Evaluate Unit Manning Document and Deployment Manning Document for accuracy.

A5.2.2. Subarea--Deployment Processing.

- Is deployment planning comprehensive, timely, and responsive to taskings?
- Do the right people process with the required equipment and documents at the right time?
- Is transportation used efficiently, i.e., the minimum number of vehicles to deploy the required people and equipment?
- Is the load plan efficiently, effectively, and safely carried out?
- Does the unit meet closure requirements?
- Are all reports accomplished in the required time?

A5.2.3. Subarea-- Deployment Processing Management.

- Does the DPU maintain accountability of people during the deployment phase?
- Do they maintain and operate the MANPER-B systems to meet all reporting requirements?

A5.3. Area--Employment.

A5.3.1. Subarea--Command and Control.

- Are units capable of performing wartime or contingency taskings upon arrival?
- Does the unit successfully meet unified commander taskings by maintaining the capability as outlined in the unit's designed operational capability (DOC), and, is this capability being accurately reported through GSORTS?
- Check adequacy and security of command, control, communications, and computer procedures with other services, commands, and users.

A5.3.2. Subarea--Operations:

- Evaluate the integration of deployed location procedures and requirements (including munitions storage and handling) into planning documents.
- Assess the timely transmission of intelligence information from mission debriefs (flying units).
- Review application of unified commander's rules of engagement (ROE) for clarity and understanding within exercise constraints.
- Evaluate established search-and-rescue (SAR) procedures within exercise constraints (flying units).
- Evaluate levels of operations, equipment, and training to sustain wartime or contingency requirements.
- Evaluate weapon systems proficiency against required standards and taskings.
- Validate ability to efficiently manage the crew force.
- Evaluate efforts to meet ATO.

A5.3.3. Maintenance:

- Evaluate maintenance efforts to meet air tasking order (ATO) or sortie generation on a daily basis.
- Validate not mission capable (NMC) rates due to supply and maintenance.
- Check performance of organizational, intermediate, and depot-level maintenance activities compared to established standards.

A5.3.4. Intelligence. Evaluate the following Air Force Intelligence Prioritized Tasks:

- (1) Provide situation awareness, threat, and target status.
- (2) Participate in development of air operations tasking order.
- (3) Consolidate, prioritize, and validate collection requirements.
- (4) Consolidate and report battle damage assessments.
- (5) Define requirements and manage inventory for targeting and MC&G products.
 - Evaluate that national, theater, force, and unit level intelligence is coordinated and integrated into unit mission planning, execution, and mission effectiveness assessments.
 - Evaluate threat assessment analysis for both air and ground forces.

A5.3.5. Weather.

- Evaluate the timeliness, accuracy, and meaningfulness of weather support to users.
- Evaluate the integration of strategic, operational, and tactical-level weather information into unit's weather products.
- Assess weather force's ability to prepare weather products with limited amounts of data.
- Evaluate ability to accurately and timely transmit tactical-level weather information.
- Assess the timely reception and transmission of weather information obtained from aircrew debriefs.

A5.3.6. Airfield Operations (Air Traffic Control and Airfield Management):

- Evaluate the ability of air traffic control to provide safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of aircraft during wartime/contingency taskings while adhering to USAF, FAA, DoD, and ICAO.
- Evaluate the ability of airfield management to ensure adequate airfield facilities (pavements, signs, markings, etc.) during wartime/contingency taskings.
- Evaluate Airfield Operations emergency actions procedures and checklists.

A5.3.7. Aircrew Life Support.

- Evaluate the ability to provide aircrews with serviceable protective, survival, and rescue equipment.
- Evaluate the ability to provide deployment packages supporting 60 days of surge flying operations.
- Evaluate the ability to support aircrew chemical defense operations.
- Evaluate the effectiveness of aircrew and technician training programs.

A5.4. Area--Mission Support.

A5.4.1. Subarea--Command and Control. Do unit control centers ensure forces under their control collect, display, report and disseminate information which in turn initiates the appropriate plans, procedures, and implementing instructions to accomplish support taskings?

A5.4.2. Subarea--Operations. Key functional areas or UTCs which need to meet unified command requirements are outlined in the following paragraphs.

A5.4.2.1. Personnel.

- Personnel Systems and Readiness Section (PSRS)/Personnel Readiness Center (PRC): Evaluate the timeliness and accuracy of all MANPER-B reports and support documents (e.g. orders).
- Personnel Support for Contingency Operations (PERSCO): Does the PERSCO maintain accountability of deployed personnel? Are the MANPER-B system reports accurate and produced in a timely manner (e.g. personnel, casualty, and force management reports)?

A5.4.2.2. Civil Engineer.

- Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force (BEEF): Assess capability to meet all theater requirements while maintaining a capability to deploy to another area if required.
- Prime BEEF Mobile Forces: Evaluate forces' ability to perform a variety of actions (as applicable). Emphasis should be given to the following: Damage Assessments, Repairs, Beddown, Minimum Operating Strip (MOS), Security, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Fire Protection, and CE Readiness.

A5.4.2.3. Services.

- Prime Readiness in Base Support (RIBS): Evaluate unit's ability to deploy and perform wartime duties specified in the UTC mission capability statement.
- Contingency Planning. Are unit emergency action procedures comprehensive and responsive to taskings? Support planning must include emergency response, strategic mission support and critical CONUS-sustaining missions.

A5.4.2.4. Air Base Defense (ABD).

- Assess the ability of ABD forces to adequately plan and conduct force protection operations according to the designed operational capability statement, mission capability statement, and time-phased force deployment date tasking.
- Check individual and team proficiency to tactically employ assigned weapons, vehicles, communications, and equipment.

A5.4.2.5. Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C⁴).

- Evaluate that timely and reliable communications links and local area networks are established and available.
- Check for compatibility and interoperability of communications systems with other units, commands, and services, as well as national or theater compatibility.
- Evaluate all back-up communications and computer systems to ensure adequate support to primary mission and/or command and control.
- Evaluate the protection afforded information systems and the information within the systems.
- Evaluate the C⁴ restoral plan and the unit's ability to execute the plan.
- Review the unit's emergency action procedures and ability to execute.
- Evaluate adequacy of network management and personal computer support.

- Evaluate that deployed communications-computer capabilities and associated support equipment meet mission requirements.

5.4.2.6. Supply.

- Evaluate the adequacy of the supply system to meet user asset requirements.
- Check on-hand ammunition and spare assets against prescribed or authorized levels.
- Assess physical control, accountability, serviceability, and efficient management of supplies and equipment.
- Evaluate ability to properly detect, sample, and analyze suspected fuel/cryogenics contamination.
- Evaluate compliance with all safety procedures and technical data during refueling and cryogenics operations.
- Assess proper fueling and loading procedures at all times.

A5.4.2.7. Transportation.

- Check maintenance and supply procedures.
- Evaluate the ability of the transportation community to meet user requirements.

A5.4.2.8. Medical.

- General Health Care Support: Evaluate triage discipline and direct primary medical activity toward returning the greatest number of airmen to duty.
- Medical Treatment and Staging Facilities: Assess the ability to decontaminate, prepare, package, plan, and receive patients to ensure quality care.
- Deployable Medical Elements: Evaluate ability to provide emergency, outpatient, and/or inpatient medical care to deployed flying and support personnel.
- Preventative Medicine: Assess enforcement of procedures required to maintain effectiveness of unit personnel.
- Aeromedical Evacuation: Evaluate ability to respond to the total spectrum of aeromedical evacuation to include inflight care and mission support which is safe and responsive to customer requirements.

A5.4.2.9. Legal Support.

- Evaluate the knowledge of assigned personnel concerning their responsibilities under the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Have all personnel received LOAC training? Is specialized training provided to aircrews, medical personnel, and Security Police? Is timely and accurate advice supplied to commanders on LOAC issues?
- Evaluate unit rules of engagement. Do they satisfy the requirements of US law and policy and of international law?
- Is legal support adequate for wartime and contingency operations?
- Evaluate the availability of legal assistance for deploying personnel.

A5.5. Area--Ability To Survive And Operate.

- Are appropriate plans established and actions demonstrated to sustain, defend, survive, and recover force capability within the assigned theater of operations (e.g. Can the Survival Recovery Center (SRC) survive and operate in a hostile (NBC) environment)?
- Were self-aid/buddy care measures adequate to ensure mission accomplishment?
- Are munitions storage and handling areas located where a weapons explosion (either accidental or enemy caused) will not destroy the unit's mission capability?

COMMON-CORE CRITERIA (CCC)
COMPLIANCE AREAS

A6.1. Compliance. For these compliance areas, all US laws, Executive Orders, DoD Directives, and AF policies and instructions apply. MAJCOMs should check Air Force-level compliance concerns during ORIs, QAFAs, or commander-directed assessments, as appropriate. Inspectors/assessors should review unit metrics and self-assessment results to determine compliance with requirements.

A6.1.1. Environmental.

- Assess the organization's managerial policy and program infrastructure to ensure compliance with all applicable federal, state, and local environmental standards.
- Evaluate the organization's Environmental Compliance Assessment and Management Program to include review of the organization's most recent Management Action Plan.
- Check the organization's Environmental Impact Analysis Process to assess whether decision-makers are protecting the environment to include floodplains, wetlands, historic sites, and endangered species.
- Evaluate organization's participation in the installation's Pollution Prevention Program to include recycling, affirmative procurement, waste minimization, hazardous material source reduction, hazardous material pharmacy, opportunity assessments, alternative fuels vehicle program, and pollution prevention management plans.

A6.1.2. Intelligence Oversight (IO).

- Assess intelligence unit's and staff's compliance with the rules and procedures pertaining to collecting, retaining, and disseminating intelligence on US persons.
- Evaluate whether intelligence units and staffs have an adequate intelligence oversight program.

A6.1.3. Safety.

- Assess how the organization adheres to safety guidelines and procedures to include OSHA and explosives safety standards.
- Assess the unit's explosive safety program to assure mission success, i.e., that an accidental explosion won't destroy mission capability.

A6.1.4. Financial Responsibilities.

- Assess organizational adherence to standard financial accountability procedures.
- Check financial process monitoring procedures and procedures to identify problems to the proper management level.

A6.1.5. Contracting.

- Evaluate that procedures are conducted according to applicable laws, directives, and instructions.
- Check contractors for compliance with contracts and statements of work.
- Determine if contracts satisfy mission requirements.

A6.1.6. Victim and Witness Protection Program.

- Assess that the installation's program complies with all statutes, directives, instructions, and Air Force policies.
- Evaluate procedures for notifying victims and witnesses of their rights under the program, including but not limited to, consultation with prosecutors, notification of case and prisoner status, separate waiting rooms, and protection, as necessary.
- Evaluate training programs established for the following personnel and agencies: commanders, first sergeants, judge advocates, surgeon generals, Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) agents, Security Police, chaplains, and personnel assigned to the Family Support Center.
- Evaluate the effectiveness of the installation's liaison with the local community to ensure victims receive coordinated assistance and compensation from both military and civilian communities.

A6.1.7. Transition Assistance Programs (TAP).

- Check availability and documentation of preseparation counseling for members at least 90 days prior to separation.
- Determine if all members retired under the Temporary Early Retirement Act (TERA) are documented as confirmed registrants for Public and Community Service (PACS) prior to outprocessing.
- Ensure DD Forms 2586, **Verification of Military Experience and Training (VMET)**, are issued to members.
- Assess the transition counseling and employment preparation program at military installations with more than 500 members assigned or serving.
- Determine if separating members' TAPs participation and mission requirements are deconflicted.
- Evaluate the allocation/availability of resources necessary to provide quality TAPs.

★A6.1.8. Command, Control, Communications, and Computers.

- Assess organization's adherence to information protection policies and procedures.
- Evaluate physical control and accountability of information systems and equipment.
- Evaluate compliance with software copyright provisions.

- Evaluate compliance with regulatory guidance regarding Communications-Electronic (CE) equipment inventory, status, and utilization reporting.

A6.1.9. Voting Assistance Program.

- Assess the organization's voting program to ensure persons covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) are informed and provided year round opportunity to vote.
- Evaluate the Installation Voting Officer's allocation/availability of sufficient resources (including but not limited to funding, communication's support, and voting materials) to conduct an effective voting program.
- Ensure installation commanders support Armed Forces Voters' Week publicity and voter registration efforts.